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Executive Summary
We examine a system of Unemployment Insurance Saving Accounts
(UISAs) as an alternative to the traditional unemployment insurance
system. Individuals are required to save up to 4 percent of wages in
special accounts and to draw unemployment compensation from
these accounts instead of taking state unemployment insurance ben-
efits. If the accounts are exhausted, the government lends money to
the account. Positive accounts earn the return on commercial paper
and negative accounts are charged that rate. Positive UISA balances
are converted into retirement income orbequeathed if the individual
dies before retirement age. Negative account balances are forgiven at
retirement age. Money taken by an unemployed individual from a
UISA with a positive balance reduces the individual's personal wealth
by an equal amount. In this case, individuals fully internalize the cost
of unemployment compensation. UISAs provide the same protection to
the unemployed as the current UI system but with less of the adverse
incentives. The key empirical question is whether accounts based on
a moderate saving rate can finance a significant share of unemploy-
ment payments or whether the concentration of unemployment among
a relatively small number of individuals implies thatthe UISA balances
would typically be negative, forcing individuals to rely on government
benefits with the same adverse effects that characterize the current UI
system. To resolve this issue we use the Panel Study on Income Dynam-
ics to simulate the UISA system over a 25 year historic period. Our
analysis indicates that almost all individuals have positive UISA bal-
ances and therefore remain sensitive to the cost ofunemployment com-
pensation. Even among individuals who experience unemployment,
most have positive account balances at the end of their unemployment36 Feldstein and Altman
spell. Although about half of the benefit dollars would go to individu-
als whose accounts are negative at the end of their working life, less
than one-third of the benefits go to individuals who also have negative
account balances when unemployed. These facts suggest a substantial
potential improvement in the incentives of the unemployed. The cost
to taxpayers of forgiving the negative balances is substantially less than
half of the taxpayer cost of the current UI system. Our analysis of the
distribution of lifetime UISA payments and taxes of household heads
shows the top quintile gaining a small cumulative amount while those
in the bottom quintile lose a very small cumulative amount. Other
quintiles are small net gainers.
1.Introduction
Unemployment insurance (UI) exists to provide protection against the
hardship that would otherwise be caused by unemployment. Unfortu-
nately, it also distorts incentives in ways that cause inefficient increases
in total unemployment. In this paper we analyze empirically a modi-
fication of the traditional unemployment insurance system. We show
that this alternative, based on individual savings accounts, can sub-
stantially reduce the adverse incentive effects of the existing unemploy-
ment insurance system without any decrease in the protection of those
who become unemployed.
Since the working paper version of this paper was distributed in
December 1998 there have been several papers that have supported the
basic premise of our study that the primary problem of the uninsured
is the lack of liquidity rather than the need for insurance as such (see
Chetty 2005; Card, Chetty, and Weber 2006; Shimer and Warning 2006;
and the papers cited in those studies.) In our approach, unemployed
individuals receive immediate access to liquidity through a combina-
tion of pre-unemployment asset accumulation and access to an addi-
tional government line of credit when they are unemployed. There
is also a pure insurance feature in the form of forgiveness at the time
of retirement of the accumulated unemployment loan balance, if any,
that results from the government line of credit. Stiglitz and Yun (2005),
Brown, Orszag, and Snower (2006), Orszag and Snower (1997), and
Coloma (1996) provide a more explicit analysis of the type of unem-
ployment insurance saving account developed in this study.
Our analysis is therefore fundamentally different from previous
studies investigating how the adverse incentive effects of the currentUnemployment Insurance Savings Accounts 37
tax-financed unemployment insurance system could be reduced by
changes in basic program parameters such as the level and duration
of benefits, the experience rating rules, and the provision of bonuses
for hiring the unemployed (Baily 1978; Meyer 1995; Mortenson 1994;
Blanchard and Tirole 2006).
The basic system that we examine requires each individual to save a
fraction of his or her wage takings in a special Unemployment Insur-
ance Saving Account (UISA). If the individual loseshis job and would
be eligible for unemployment benefits under the current UI rules, he
withdraws an amount equal to the regular UI benefits from his personal
UISA. If the funds in the account are not sufficient to pay the benefit, the
government lends the necessary amount to the account. Accounts earn
a market rate of return on existingbalances and pay the government
the same return on borrowed amounts. At retirement age the funds in
the UISA are merged into the individual's IRA or other investment-
based retirement saving plans. An individual who dies with a positive
account balance bequeaths that amount to his spouse or otherheirs.
The government cancels the debt of those who reach retirement age
(or die before then) with negative account balances. More details of the
plan are described in the third section.
All unemployed individuals would therefore receive the same cash
amounts during spells of unemployment from theirUISAs as they
would under the existing unemployment insurance rules. Their full cur-
rent protection is thus maintained. Any individualwhose UISA always
has a positive balance (and who expects that it would remain positive)
would completely internalize the cost of unemployment benefits and
therefore would not have any incentive to increase in an inefficient way
the frequency or duration of his unemployment spells becauseof the
availability of those benefits. The adverse incentive problem would
arise only for individuals who expect that they will retire or die with
negative balances in their UISAs. For such individuals, the benefits
received because of additional unemployment have no personal cost.
They face the same incentives to excess unemployment that theywould
under the existing unemployment system, but without the discipline
that comes from employer experience rating.'
The feasibility of this savings account approach to unemployment
insurance depends on the extent to which insured unemployment is
concentrated in a subgroup of the population. Some individuals expe-
rience a disproportionate share of the total unemployment days and
this concentration applies to insured unemployment as well as to38 Feldstein and Altman
unemployment in general (see, e.g., Meyer and Rosenbaum 1996).
If the insured unemployment is sufficiently concentrated, individu-
als may not be able to finance their own unemployment benefits by
saving moderate shares of their earnings in the UISAs.2 The use of
individual savings accounts to finance unemployment benefits would
be irrelevant if those who collect benefits would typically have nega-
tive balance accounts and therefore be drawing on the government
guarantee.
Before carrying out the current research, we regarded this asa poten-
tially serious problem that could make the savings account approach
unworkable. It is important therefore to assess the proportion of indi-
viduals who develop negative account balances and the extent to which
UI benefits are now paid to individuals who would have negative
accounts. To do so we examine the extensive experience represented by
individuals in the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). Our anal-
ysis of these data implies that approximately 5 percent of employees
would retire or die with negative account balances and that only about
half of all benefits from the UISAs would be paid to such individuals.
The cost to the government of the unrecovered loans in the negative
accounts is substantially less than the cost ofthe current unemploy-
ment insurance system, permitting a reduction in the current distor-
tionary payroll tax as well as in the distortionary effects of the existing
benefit system. These findings tell us that the savings account approach
to unemployment insurance, combined with a government guarantee,
can be an economically viable policy option.
The second section of this paper summarizes the existing unem-
ployment insurance system and discusses the various ways in which
it causes a rise in the frequency and duration of unemployment. In the
third section we describe the operation of the Unemployment Insur-
ance Savings Accounts and the several alternative funding options that
we will analyze in the remainder of the paper. The fourth section then
uses the Panel Study of Income Dynamics to show how a large group of
individuals would have been affected by these alternatives to the exist-
ing unemployment insurance system over periods of up to 25 years.
The fifth section analyzes the distributional effects of the UISA system
and of the associated reduction in the UI payroll tax. The sixth section
briefly discusses the potential mutually reinforcing effect of a behav-
ioral response of unemployment to the improved incentives implied by
the UISA system. There is a brief concluding section.Unemployment Insurance Savings Accounts 39
2.The Current Unemployment Insurance System and Its Problems
To discuss the distorting effects of the current UI system on the fre-
quency and duration of unemployment, it is useful tobegin by review-
ing the current system's basic rules. Although unemployment insurance
rules differ among the individual states, the basic structure is quite
similar throughout the country. An individual who has worked a suffi-
cient amount or earned a sufficient amount of wage income during the
past year is eligible to receive benefits if he or she is laid off.3 Benefits
are approximately 50 percent of the unemployedindividual's previous
gross wage, subject to a minimum weekly benefit floorthat raises the
percentage for low wage workers and a maximum weekly benefit ceil-
ing that lowers the percentage for high wage workers. Some states also
provide supplementary benefits if the unemployed individual has a
dependent spouse or children. The average weekly benefit in 1997 was
$193 (an amount that rose to $262 in 2003). Benefits are generally pay-
able for a maximum of 26 weeks.
Benefits are subject to federal personal income tax but not to the Social
Security payroll tax (or the equivalent tax for self-employed individu-
als). Some states include unemployment benefits in taxable income for
assessing the state income tax.
Unemployment benefits are financed by taxes levied on firms by the
state governments. Each firm pays a percentage of the earnings ofeach
employee up to a relatively low maximum level that varies among the
states; the maximum taxable wage for the UI tax was only $7,000 in
most states in 1997; by 2006, some states still had a maximum of $7,000
but Massachusetts had increased to $14,000. The percentage that each
firm pays depends on the past experience of that firm as a UI taxpayer
and of its employees as UI benefit recipients. This "experience rating"
system is intended to cause the firms to internalize the cost of the unem-
ployment benefits of its employees. However, because there are both
lower and upper limits on these state UI tax rates, many firms are not
effectively experience rated, i.e., an additional layoff or an additional
week of unemployment by a former employee would have no effect on
the firm's UI tax bill.4
The most obvious and most thoroughly researched effect of the exist-
ing UI system on unemployment is the increase in the duration of the
unemployment spells. By reducing the cost of remaining unemployed,
UI benefits induce individuals to have longer spells in order to search40 Feldstein and Altman
for a better job or simply to enjoy some leisure or the opportunity to
work at home. There is substantial evidence that the level and maxi-
mum duration of UI benefits affects the level of reservation wages and
the duration of unemployment spells (Feldstein and Poterba 1984; Katz
and Meyer 1990; Moffitt 1985).
This evidence and the underlying search theory (e.g., Baily 1977)
would seem to provide a clear case that UI induces excessive search.
Calculations for a typical employee imply that the combination of
UI benefits and personal taxes reduces the net cost of search to
about one-fourth of the unemployed individual's potential marginal
product.5 However, against this presumption that UI benefits cause
excessive search it is sometimes argued that in the absence of unem-
ployment benefits individuals would not search long enough because
they lack access to the capital market and therefore could not finance
the optimal amount of search. The Unemployment Insurance Savings
Accounts provide the access to funds to finance the optimal search with
a reinsurance mechanism provided by the government in case the indi-
vidual's fund is exhausted. Individuals with positive UTSA balances are
motivated to take the costs and benefits of search into account correctly6
while those with permanently negative account balances are in the same
situation as today's UI recipients. The current system of UI benefits
not only increases the duration of unemployment of those who are
unemployed but also increases the frequency of temporary layoffs.
Because of the subsidy inherent in the current system of benefits,
individuals will prefer to be unemployed rather than to work at a
time when the marginal revenue product of their labor is depressed
(Feldstein 1976). Empirical research (Card and Levine 1994; Feldstein
1978) shows that this is true for seasonal unemployment and other
forms of temporary layoffs. If individuals were instead to finance
such spells of unemployment by drawing from their own UISAs
they would have no incentive to choose excessive spells of temporary
unemployment.
The current payment of benefits to workers who become unem-
ployed reduces the wage premium required to compensate employees
for the risk of being laid off. The unemployment insurance system thus
lowers the cost of production in firms that have above-average layoff
rates, whether for cyclical, seasonal or other reasons. The reduced cost
of production in such unemployment-intensive firms lowers the price
of the associated product and therefore raises its share in GDP relative
to what it would be without the UI subsidy. This shift in the mix ofUnemployment Insurance Savings Accounts 41
products raises the overall unemployment rate. Once again, the UISAs
would eliminate the subsidy for those with positive balances, leading
to an adjustment in wages that raises the costof those products and of
those firms that contribute most to overall unemployment.
3.Unemployment Insurance Savings Accounts: Five Alternative
Options
In a UTSA plan each individual (or that individual'semployer7) would
be required to contribute a fraction of wage income to aUISA. The
magnitude of this mandatory saving is limited in different ways in
the alterative options described in this section. The optionsspecify
different limits on the maximum annual income to whichthe saving
fraction applies. Some options permit deposits to stop whenthe accu-
mulated balance reaches a specified fraction of the individual's annual
earnings.
The funds deposited to the UISA would come from pretax income,
just as current UI tax payments do. They would accumulatetax-free. If
the funds are withdrawn in lieu of UI benefits, they wouldbe consid-
ered taxable income just as UI benefits are today. It would benatural
to apply the tax to the funds withdrawn in retirement orby heirs, just
as 401k and traditionalIRA funds are taxed. Alternatively, the funds
deposited in UISAs could come from after-tax income and subsequent
withdrawals would be untaxed (as they are in Roth IRAs).
The funds in the UISAs might be invested by the individuals in a vari-
ety of ways similar to IRA or 401k investments.Since the government
augments the funds in those accounts that haveinsufficient funds to
meet benefits during spells of unemployment, the natureof the invest-
ments might be more tightly regulated than thefunds in IRAs or 401k
accounts. We shall not explore this issue here but willdiscuss calcula-
tions based on two alternative investment strategies.
In the more conservative strategy the UISAs areinvested in money
market mutual funds that earn the six-month commercial paper rate
of interest. In an alternative investment strategy the accounts are
invested in a continuously rebalanced mixture consisting of 60 percent
corporate stock (represented by the Standardand Poors 500 index)
and 40 percent corporate bonds (based on the Salomon Brothersbond
index). This portfolio produced a real rate of return of 5.9 percent
for the period from 1946 to 1992 (Feldstein andRanguelova 1998;
extending the sample period to the present time would have verylittle42 Feldstein and Altman
effect on this rate of ret-urn.) We reduce this yield by 0.4 percentage
points (to 5.5 percent) to allow for administrative costs of the portfolio
management.
We assume that individuals must choose permanently between the
commercial paper strategy and the 5.5 percent strategy andmay not
change their rates of return at any time in the analysis. The individuals
whose account balances are insufficient to pay the benefits to which
they are entitled can borrow from the government at the same rate as
they earn in their account. The results that we present below show that
our conclusions are not sensitive to the choice between these two rates
of return.
The amounts that individuals would withdraw from their UISAs
when they are eligible for benefits under current UI rules are thesame
as the benefits that they would receive under the current UI system.
Each of the five options that we study requires individuals to contrib-
ute 4 percent of their wages up to the maximum amount specified by
that particular option. We assume a five year start-up period during
which individuals contribute to their UISAs but during which the
unemployed continue to receive government UI benefits under the cur-
rent system.
After describing these five alternatives, we use the Panel Study of
Income Dynamics data to assess how the choice among these options
affects the performance of the system.
Option 1 High Saving Base
Individuals contribute 4 percent of earnings up to a maximum of about
three times the average weekly wage. For the first year of the PSID data
(1967), the annual wage ceiling for our UISA contributions is $15,000.
This ceiling then grows in proportion to the growth of theaverage
weekly wage, reaching about $52,000 in 1991, the lastyear of the PSID
sample which we studied.
Option 2 Low Saving Base
The saving base in option 1 permits a rapid accumulation of UTSA bal-
ances by high wage earners but is arguably unnecessarily high for two
reasons. First, the dollar limit on the level of weekly benefits is equiva-
lent to providing a 50 percent replacement rate only up toa level that
is approximately equal to the average weekly wage. Second, the fre-
quency of unemployment declines as wages rise and is substantially
less among individuals with above average wages.Unemployment Insurance Savings Accounts 43
Option 2 requires individuals to contribute 4 percent of all earnings
up to a level only slightly abovethe median wage, a level that is also
roughly equal to the level of wages on which UI benefits arecurrently
based. For the first year of the PSID data (1967), the wageceiling is
taken to be $6,000. This ceiling then grows in proportion tothe growth
of the average weekly wage, reaching $21,000 in 1991.
Option 3 Target Account Fund
In the first two options, individuals are required tocontinue contribut-
ing to their UISAs regardless of their unemploymentexperience and of
the amounts accumulated in their accounts. Since benefits are50 per-
cent of wages (up to the ceiling) and last for no morethan six months in
a spell, the maximumbenefit that can be drawn in a single spell is only
one-fourth of a year's earnings. Most spells of unemployment aresub-
stantially shorter than six months, the median spell being less than ten
weeks in almost all years. Spells would be even shorter with thechange
in incentives provided by the savings accountapproach.
Option 3 therefore provides that the individual stopscontributing
to the UISA when the accumulated balancereaches 50 percent of the
individual's wage income in the previous year or 50 percent of theceil-
ing amount in option 2 if that is smaller.
Option 4 Experience-Based Target Account Fund
Individuals with substantial risk of unemployment shouldhave larger
account balances than those who are less likely tobe unemployed.
Option 3 can be modified to reduce the target level ofthe account fund
for those with low unemployment experienceand to increase it for
those with substantial unemployment experience. Option 4provides
one such modification. Individuals saveuntil the fund reaches the sum
of (1) 30 percent of the individual's annual wage (or of the wageceiling
specified in options 2 and 3 if that is lower) plus (2) twicethe individu-
al's total UI withdrawals during the past two years.
Consider, for example, an individual with $30,000 of base period
annual wage income who has had two eight-week spells of compen-
sated unemployment during the past two years. The UISAwithdrawals
during those 16 weeks would be$3,200.8 Option 3 would require that
individual to save 4 percent of wages until the fund balancereached
$10,500. In contrast, option four would change this to the sumof $6,300
(30 percent of the specified earnings "ceiling")plus $6,400 (twice
the benefits withdrawn in the past two years), a totalof $12,700. The44 Feldstein and Altman
accumulation would still be at a rate of 4 percent of the first $20,000 of
wages.
Accumulating more in this way should not be seen asa penalty since
individuals own the funds in their UISAs and can eventuallyconsume
or bequeath them. The funds are there as a buffer to reduce the govern-
ment's risk in guaranteeing that benefits will be paideven if the UISAs
have insufficient funds.
Option 5 An Experience Rating Component
Although a system of UISAs can substantially reduce many individu-
als' incentives for longer or more frequent spells of unemployment, it
does eliminate the effect of experience rating.9 While experience rating
is not needed to correct incentives when individuals have positive UISA
balances, it would improve incentives when individuals have negative
balances and are therefore motivated to act as if the governmentpro-
vides their unemployment benefits. Option 5 combines the basic contri-
bution requirement of Option 2 with a requirement that employerspay
the first five weeks of benefits in each spell.'° This has two potentially
favorable effects on incentives. First, by reducing the amount that indi-
viduals withdraw from their accounts duringany given spell, they are
more likely to have a positive balance and therefore to be sensitive to
the cost of providing benefits. Second, even for those individuals with
negative accounts, the employer has an incentive not to createexcess
unemployment, the traditional role of experience rating.'1
4.Analyzing the Options with the PSID Data
The Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) provides longitudinal data
on individuals that are well-suited to analyzing the feasibility of sub-
stituting UISAs for the existing unemployment insurance system.'2 The
PSID contains linked interview data on a national probability sample of
households and subsequent split-offs for the period from 1967 through
1991. The data for each year and each head of household include the
total UI benefits received as well as demographic and labor market
information.
We focus our analysis on the individuals who were heads of house-
holds in 1967. The head of household can be eithera single individual
or the individual in a household who is designated as the head of the
unit. We include only those individuals who were still in the sample
and under age 65 in 1972, i.e., in the first year after the five-year periodUnemployment Insurance Sa.iings Accounts 45
in which individuals make deposits to the savings accounts but draw
benefits only from the regular state UI program. We then follow these
2,773 individuals until the end of the data sample in 1991 or untilthe
year in which they die, retire or otherwiseleave the sample. Separate
tabulations are presented in the appendix for the sub-sample of 1,990
individuals who by 1991 are no longer employed or in the PSID sample.
We impute retirements at age 65 for all workers.
Our procedure is very straightforward. For each of the options, we
accumulate funds according to the rules of that option. The accounts
earn the commercial paper rate in onesimulation and a 5.5 percent real
return in the alternative simulation. Those are also the ratescharged on
negative balances. In each year, starting with the sixth year of the simu-
lation, we subtract from each account the UI benefits that the individual
received in that year.
The key results for the full sample based on the commercial paper
rate of return are shown in table 2.1 and for the 5.5 percent rateof return
in Appendix table 2.A1. The corresponding results for the sub-sample
of individuals who had died, retired or otherwise left the sample are
presented in Appendix tables 2.A2 and 2.A3.
All of the results in these tables assume no behavioral response to
the change in unemployment incentives. We return to this issue in the
sixth section and present some results that suggest the sensitivity of our
calculations to possible behavioral responses.
Consider first the results in table 2.1 for Option 1. Row one shows
that only 5.2 percent of all the individuals in the PSID sample of house-
hold heads had negative balances at the end of their time in the PSID.
If employees correctly anticipated their final condition, almost 95 per-
cent of employees would be fully sensitive to the costof unemployment
benefits. The figure is essentially the same (5.3 percent, from table 2.A1)
if we look only at "finishers," i.e., those who had died, retired or left the
sample by 1991.
A stricter measure of sensitivity is the fraction of individualswhose
accounts were ever negative. Row 2 shows that only 6.8 percentof
individuals ever had negative accounts. For the remaining 93 percent,
receiving unemployment benefits would mean drawing from their own
funds. Although many of these did not have any spells of unemploy-
ment, their positive UISA balance gave them a strongerinventive to
avoid unemployment than they had in the existing UI system.
Most individuals who become unemployed have positive accounts













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































7Unemployment Insurance Savings Accounts 47
one-quarter of the unemployment spells in which benefits are received
is the account negative at the end of the spell. This reflects the fact that
most spells are short and come when the individuals have accumulated
enough in their UISAs to finance the spell.
The result is similar when we look at the terminal UISA balances at
the end of the PSID experience, taking into account future deposits to
the UISA and future spells of unemployment; 20 percent of accounts
in which individuals receive UI benefits are negative at the end of the
spell and at the end of the PSID sample (shown in row 4 of the table).
Even individuals whose accounts are negative at some point in time
(those shown in row 2) need not assume that they will remain negative.
About one-quarter of those individuals (23.4 percent, shown in row 5)
have positive terminal balances when they retire or leave the sample, or
in 1991 when the sample ends.
When we turn from the numbers of individuals to the amount of
UISA payments, we find that only 31.1 percent of UISA benefits are
paid in spells that end with negative balances for individuals that
also have negative terminal balances (row 6). This is the group most
likely to assume that the costs of the UISA benefits will be borne by the
government. A somewhat higher percentage of UISA payments go to
individuals in spells that are not necessarily negative but that lead to a
negative terminal balance (44.1 percent, shown in row 7). Members of
this group may be sensitive to the cost of UISA payments during those
spells (and years) when their balances are positive and they have not
yet concluded that the terminal balance will be negative.
Row 8 shows the dollars paid by the government and not subse-
quently repaid by the individuals as a percentage of the total UISA
payments received by all individuals Because the benefits in the UISA
system are the same as the UI benefits in the current UI system, this
ratio is also the ratio of the tax-financed UISA benefits to the total tax-
financed benefits under the existing UI system. The estimate of 27.4
percent shown in row 8 means that the cost of the UISA to taxpayers
with option 1 and no behavioral response would be only 27.4 percent of
the cost to taxpayers of the existing UI system.'3 The distorting effects
of the existing UI payroll tax are separate from the distorting effects of
the benefits conditioned on unemployment.
In thinking about the incentive effects implied by these results it is
important to consider the effects on both the duration and the frequency
of unemployment. Individuals who have positive balances or who
believe that they will end their careers with positive balances will not48 Feldstein and Altman
want to become unemployed and, if they do became unemployed, will
have no incentive to remain unemployed. The evidence that most indi-
viduals have positive balance accounts and that they end their careers
with positive balance accounts shows that (assuming they understand
this likelihood) they generally face the cost of unemployment and, in
contrast to the situation with the existing UI rules, would have little
incentive for behavior that would increase either the frequency or dura-
tion of unemployment.
The percentage of funds withdrawn by individuals who end their
working life (or are working when the PSID ends) with accounts that
have negative balances appears to suggest that in about 44 percent of
the unemployed weeks the individuals that currently receive unem-
ployment insurance benefits would face the same adverse incentives
under the UISA system as they do under the current UI system. While
eliminating the distortion for the other 56 percent of the weeks would
be a substantial achievement of the UISA approach, this 56 percent fig-
ure understates for several reasons the extent of the improvement in
incentives that would occur. First, some of the spells of unemployment
that now end with permanently negative balances would never occur
if the individuals' incentives were different. Second, since the duration
of the spells would be shortened by the change in incentives, fewer of
the spells would actually lead to negative balance accounts. While we
do not have an estimate of the effect of these behavioral responses, we
believe that the evidence here indicates that the incentives would be
improved for substantially more than half of the spells and weeks of
current insured unemployment. We return below (in the sixth section)
to consider the implications of a behavioral response to the improved
incentives.
The results with the other options are generally similar to the results
with option 1, although options 2, 3, and 4 involve a smaller saving
base and therefore more frequent negative balances. More specifically,
shifting to a lower wage base for the saving requirement (option
2 requires a 4 percent saving rate on wage income up to about the
median wage) raises the percentages that become negative or end nega-
tive by about two percentage points. With the lower amount of sav-
ing, the percentage of spells that end with negative account balances
becomes 30.5 percent instead of the 24.3 percent with option 1 (row 3).
The number of spells that end with negative balances and that also go
on to negative terminal balances rises from 20 percent with option 1 to
25 percent (row 4). Capping the saving requirement for workers withUnemployment Insurance Savings Accounts 49
above average incomes thus reduces the sensitivity but still leaves most
individuals who experience unemployment with a positive account
balance.
Option 3 allows workers to stop contributing to their accounts when
the balance reaches 50 percent of their savings wage base under option
2. This has essentially no effect on any of the performance measures.
For those who experience no unemployment, it reduces substantially
the amount of lifetime saving that is required in the UISAs without
changing the likely sensitivity of this group or others.
Option 4 makes the target level of accumulation for the UISA depend
on the recent unemployment experience, lowering the basic target to
only 30 percent of the savings wage base under option 2 but then add-
ing the benefits drawn in the past two years to this amount. The positive
and negative effects are reasonably balanced, causing little affect on the
various performance measures shown in table 2.1. For those with little
or no unemployment, this option permits a substantially lower rate of
saving.
Option 5 requires the employer to pay the first five weeks of unem-
ployment benefits in every spell and is otherwise similar to option 2.
Only after the five weeks does the individual draw benefits from the
UISA. This makes the employer directly sensitive to the cost of unem-
ployment for all employees, including those with negative balances. It
also reduces substantially the probability that employees who experi-
ence unemployment will develop a negative balance or end their career
with a negative balance. Thus row 4 shows that among unemployment
spells resulting in negative balances, the percentage of spells from indi-
viduals who end their careers (or the time in the PSID sample) with a
negative balance falls from 25 percent with option 2 to 22 percent with
option 5.
5.Distributional Effects of Switching to UISA System
The effect on each individual's disposable income of shifting from the
current UI rules to a UTSA system depends on the individual's unem-
ployment experience and the level of the individual's income. There are
three components of the effect: (1) the required saving contribution to
the individual's UISA account; (2) the net balance in the UISA account
at retirement age; and (3) the change in the payroll tax payment. The
benefits paid during unemployment can be ignored because they are
always the same in the two systems.50 Feldstein and Altman
Any analysis of the distributional effect of shifting from one system
to another involves the usual incidence issues about the effect of
induced behavioral changes on wages and other pretax factor incomes.
These incidence issues are particularly difficult in the current case
because the program change involves not only taxes but also trans-
fers conditioned on unemployment experience. We limit our analysis
therefore to the nominal analysis, i.e., to the estimated distribution of
individual payments with no changes in gross wages or other factor
incomes. We assume moreover that all payments are borne by the indi-
viduals, regardless of whether they are made by the individual or the
firm.
A second caveat is necessary about interpreting the distributional
effects by income class tabulated in this section. This analysis refers
only to heads of households and makes no attempt to incorporate the
distributional effects of a shift to a UISA system on others in the same
household. The sample is further restricted to those individuals who
were less than 45 years old in 1967 in order to study a relatively long
working period.
Before looking at the calculations, it is useful to note the way that the
shift from the existing UI rules to a UISA system affects individuals at
two extremes: those with no unemployment during their working life
and those whose unemployment is so substantial that they end their
working life with a negative UISA balance. For individuals who experi-
ence no unemployment, the net present value of UISA saving deposits
and the balances withdrawn at retirement is zero (discounting at what-
ever rate is used to accumulate those balances). Such individuals are
net gainers from the switch to the UISA system since the taxes required
to fund the benefits of those who have negative final balances are less
than the taxes required by the current system to fund all UI benefits.
Because the tax is levied on earnings up to a relatively low level ($7,000
in many states in 1997), the favorable tax reduction effect is the same
for all individuals above that low level and declines with income below
that level.
For individuals who experience substantial unemployment and retire
with negative accounts, the net discounted present value of the required
UISA savings represents a net tax. Against this must be balanced the
reduction in the regular UI payroll tax (which is the same reduction as
that enjoyed by those with no unemployment). Since the current pay-
roll tax is less than the UISA saving requirement, the reduction in the
payroll tax is clearly less than the UISA saving requirement, implyingUnemployment Insurance Savings Accounts 51
that individuals who have negative balances incur a net reduction in
the present value of their disposable income.
These are of course the two extreme cases. To assess the overall distri-
butional effect of the switch, we divide our sample into lifetime income
quintiles based on real mean annual income during the individual's
working years between 1967 and 1991. For each quintile, we calculate
the discounted present values as of 1967 of (1) the required savings
deposited to UI saving accounts; (2) the funds available at retirement
age; and (3) the reduced payroll tax in each year. We estimate the payroll
tax reduction of individual i in year t as TAXCUT11 = (1 - reltax)TI
where: reltax is the ratio of the payroll tax with the UISA system to the
payroll tax with the existing UI system, as shown in row 8 of table 2.1
for each UISA option; TI1 is the taxable wage income for individual I in
year t (up to the payroll tax ceiling in that year); and O is the national
average UI payroll tax rate in year t under the current UI rules.
To estimate these values, we assume that the maximum taxable earn-
ings for the UI payroll tax (Tn) is $7,000 in 1997 and scale it down in
earlier years in proportion to the average weekly earnings in the total
private U.S. economy. For each individual, the value of TI1 is the lesser
of (Tn) and that individual's wage in year t. The national average UI
payroll tax rate in year t is estimated as= BEN/[0.9 TN] where
BEN is the aggregate national UI benefits paid in year t, 0.9 Tis the
estimated average taxable earnings for the UI tax (we scale by 0.9 since
not all workers will earn $7,000 in 1997 dollars), and N1 is the number
of individuals in covered employment.14
The present values, calculated using the six-month commercial paper
interest rate, are shown in table 2.2; a separate calculation based on the
5.5 percent real rate of return is presented in Appendix table 2.A4. We
present estimates for options 1, 2, and 3.
The lowest quintile of households corresponds to those in which the
head earned an average lifetime income of only $12,293 a year in 1991
dollars during the years that the individual worked between 1967 and
1991. The second and third quintiles had average lifetime earnings in
1991 dollars of $23,976 and $31,948 while the top group had average
earnings of $71,561.
The first three rows of table 2.2 show the present discounted
value in 1967 of the positive terminal UISA balances (the refunded
amounts) minus the UISA saving deposits, discounting at the com-
mercial paper discount rate in each year. Thus individuals in the low-























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































8Unemployment Insurance Savings Accounts 53
deposits (discounted to 1967) than the amount that they had in their
UISA accounts (treating negative accounts as zero, since such debts are
forgiven) at the time of retirement or death (also discounted to 1967).
The $591 amount excludes the value of the benefits received since that
does not change as we go from current UI rules to the UTSA system. In
the aggregate, this bottom quintile receives a disproportionately large
share of the benefits relative to the amount that it provides in UISA
deposits, causing it to receive a substantial transfer from the UISA sys-
tem just as it does from the current UT system. But because we are inter-
ested in the distributional effects of shifting from the current UI rules to
a UISA system, rather than the distributional effects of the UTSA system
itself, and since the benefits are exactly the same in the two systems, we
ignore the benefits and focus on the difference between the amount that
the individuals get in refunds at the time of retirement or death (i.e., the
positive UISA balances at those times) and the amounts contributed as
saving deposits, all discounted to the beginning of the sample.
This negative effect is balanced by the positive effect of lower payroll
taxes. With option 1, the tax saving associated with replacing the cur-
rent UI system with a UTSA system (as noted in row 8 of table 2.1) is 73
percent of the UI payroll taxes that would otherwise be paid under the
current rules. For individuals in quintile 1, the present value of these
payroll tax reductions (shown in the first row of the second part of table
2.2) is $496. These tax savings offset most of the PDV excess of UISA sav-
ings over balance refunds for this group, leaving a net negative present
value cost of $95 for the shift from current UI rules to UISA rules.
Since this is the present value of the net effects over the 25 year period,
it is essentially too small to be of significant concern. This "loss" is of
course before considering any of the potential gainsboth financially
and in terms of economic efficiencythat would result from the behav-
ioral effects of the shift to the UISA system.
The second quintile has a net positive gain of $22, again essentially
close to zero when compared to the 25 year present value of the earn-
ings of individuals with average annual earnings of nearly $24,000. The
largest effect is the positive gain of the top quintile, a lifetime present
value gain of $468, which is also quite small relative to the average
annual earnings of more than $70,000 in this group.
The results for the other two options are similar, with relatively small
lifetime present value losses in the bottom half of the distribution of
lifetime income and relatively small lifetime gains in the top half of the
distribution.54 Feldstein and Altman
6.Effects of Unemployment Responses to the Unemployment
Compensation System
The first section of this paper discussed the various ways in which the
existing unemployment insurance system increases the frequency and
duration of unemployment. We have also considered how shifting to
the UISA system would change these incentives in ways that reduce
unemployment. An explicit model of the effect of shifting to a UISA
system on the frequency and duration of unemployment would have to
deal with individuals' expectations about the probability that they will
shift from an existing positive account balance to a negative account
balance at the time of retirement (and therefore should not currently be
sensitive to the effect of unemployment on their UI account) or from an
existing negative UISA account balance to a positive terminal balance
(implying that they should be concerned about the cost of their current
unemployment benefits).
Although such an analysis lies beyond the scope of this paper, it is
clear that the shift to the UISA system would initiate a mutually rein-
forcing process in which reduced subsidies to unemployment would
reduce the frequency and duration of unemployment which would
in turn imply that the a larger fraction of UISA payments were from
individual account balances rather than from the government. This vir-
tuous spiral would converge to lower probabilities of unemployment
and lower durations of unemployment spells than are observed in the
historic data.
To indicate how such a virtuous spiral might improve the perfor-
mance and reduce the taxpayer cost of the UISA system, we present
simulations of the UISA option 1 on the assumption that all UI spells
are reduced by either 10 percent or 30 percent in duration. These simu-
lations are shown in table 2.3. Although a reduction in the frequency
of unemployment is not specifically included, the analysis can be
regarded as a way of observing the effect of 10 percent or 30 percent
fewer unemployed days, regardless of whether this is from changes
in frequency or duration. As a rough generalization, the results show
that a 30 percent reduction in the amount of eligible unemployment
reduces the proportion of individuals who have negative balances
or who end with a negative account balance by at least one-quarter.
The percentage of spells that end with negative balances arid the per-
centage of spells by individuals who eventually have negative balancesUnemployment Insurance Savings Accounts 55
Table 2.3
Effects of 10% and 30% Reductions in Unemployment Days on the Implications of IJISA
Option 1
The analysis is based on the full sample of 2,773 original heads of households in the PSID
sample from 1967 to 1991, including those still working in 1991. The calculations use the
commercial paper rate of return on UTSA balances, both positive and negative. See text
for definitions.
at the end of their careers also fall, this time by about one-third. The
same is also true of the aggregate dollar value of benefits. This does
not show that a 30 percent reduction in aggregate unemployment days
is likely but only that, if it does occur, it will cause a large reinforc-
ing decline in the number who face or can expect to face negative bal-
ances.
The 30 percent reduction in the amount of insured unemployment
also has the effect of cutting the tax-financed benefits in half, from 27.5
percent of the current UI benefits with no behavioral response to 13.7
percent with a 30 percent reduction in days with compensated unem-
ployment.
7.Summary and Conclusion
In this paper we have examined a system of Unemployment Insurance








(1) Negative terminal balance 5.2 4.8 3.7
(2) Negative balance ever 6.8 5.8 5.1
Eligible unemployment spells
(3) Negative balance at end of spell 24.3 21.6 16.7
(4) Negative balance & negative terminal balance19.9 18.3 13.6
Employees with negative balances ever
(5) Return to positive terminal balance 23.4 17.4 27.6
Unemployment compensation dollars
(6) Negative balance & negative terminal balance31.1 28.5 20.5
(7) Negative terminal balance 44.1 42.3 32.5
Net government payments
(8) Percent of total T.JISA payments 27.4 22.0 13.756 Feldstein and Altman
insurance system. The system requires individuals to save a modest
share of wages in special accounts and to draw unemployment com-
pensation from these accounts instead of taking state unemployment
insurance benefits. If the accounts are exhausted, the government lends
money to the account. Negative account balances are forgiven at retire-
ment age.
Positive UISA balances are converted into retirement income or
bequeathed if the individual dies before retirement age. Any dollar
taken from a UISA with a positive balance reduces the individual's
personal wealth by a dollar. As such, the UISAs cause individuals to
internalize the cost of unemployment compensation. The UISAs can
therefore in principle provide the same level of protection to the unem-
ployed with less of the adverse incentives that now increase the fre-
quency and duration of unemployment.
The key operational question about the feasibility of UISAs is whether
accounts based on a moderate saving rate can finance a significant share
of unemployment payments or whether the concentration of unem-
ployment among a relatively small number of individuals implies that
the UISA balances would typically be exhausted, forcing individuals to
rely on government benefits with the same adverse effects that charac-
terize the current UI system.
To resolve this issue we use the Panel Study on Income Dynamics to
simulate the UTSA system over a 25-year historic period. Our analysis
indicates that almost all individuals have positive UISA balances and
therefore remain sensitive to the cost of unemployment compensation.
Even among individuals who experience unemployment, most would
still have positive account balances at the end of their unemployment
spell. Although about half of the benefit dollars would go to individuals
whose accounts are negative at the end of their working life, less than
one-third of the benefits go to individuals who currently have negative
account balances or who will have negative account balances at the end
of their current unemployment spell. All of this suggests a substantial
improvement in the incentives of the unemployed.
The reduction in the cost to taxpayers of more than 60 percent of
the current taxpayer burden represents a substantial further potential
improvement in the efficiency of the labor market. Our analysis of the
distribution of lifetime UISA payments and taxes shows that the house-
hold heads in the top quintile gain a small cumulative amount while
those in the bottom quintile lose a very small amount. Other quintiles
are small net gainers.Unemployment Insurance Savings Accounts 57
Notes
Martin Feldstein is Professor of Economics at Harvard University and President of the
National Bureau of Economic Research. This is a slightly revised version of NBER Work-
ing Paper 6860, distributed in December 1998. At that time, Daniel Altman was a gradu-
ate student at Harvard University and a NBER-National Institutes on Aging Pre-Doctoral
Fellow. The authors are grateful to Richard Freeman, Ed Glaeser, John Gruber, Caroline
Hoxby, Larry Katz, Bruce Meyer, Jim Poterba, and members of the Harvard Seminar on
Labor Economics back in 1998 and to Raj Chetty, Ivan Werning, and Jim Poterba for more
recent comments. Although we planned to do additional work on this problem, Dr. Alt-
man immediately began a career in economic journalism, writing for the Economist, the
New York Times, and others. Since it is clear that we will not get back to this, we decided
to publish it essentially as originally written.
Experience rating can affect firms' decisions to lay off employees and the duration
of unemployment among those on temporary layoff. Although the U.S. unemployment
insurance rules provide for experience rating, many firms do not face effective experience
rating. We return to these issues below, including an option that provides some of the
incentive effects of experience rating.
To the extent that the identities of those who will experience large amounts of lifetime
unemployment are unknown at the start of their working lives, the social provision and
subsidy of unemployment benefits would therefore be a kind of optimal catastrophic
insurance.
Individuals who quit a job may be eligible for benefits if their quitting is found to be
"for just cause." In some states quitters are eligible after an extensive waiting period.
Unemployed individuals who are new entrants to the labor force or reentrants without
recent work experience are not eligible for unemployment insurance benefits.
On experience rating and its potential effects, see Feldstein (1976).
Consider an individual who can earn $100 a day and faces a federal marginal income
tax rate of 28 percent, a state marginal income tax rate of 5 percent and a payroll tax rate
of 7.65 percent. Taxes reduce the net take-home pay of that individual from the $100 gross
pay to $59.35. If the individual is unemployed, he or she receives gross unemployment
benefits of $50, subject to a 28 percent federal income tax; the resulting net benefit is
therefore $36. The net cost to the individual of remaining unemployed for the day is the
difference between these two net amounts or $23.35. By contrast the individual's mar-
ginal product of labor is the sum of the $100 gross pay and the additional $7.65 employer
payroll tax. The net cost of remaining unemployed is thus only 22 percent of the marginal
product of labor. Bringing this up to date by substituting a 25 percent marginal tax rate
for the earlier 28 percent rate would only change these net amounts very little.
The opportunity cost of search is still substantially less than the marginal product of
labor but the gain from search is also reduced by the same set of marginal tax rates. With
the capital market problem solved, the amount of search done by a rational and risk-neu-
tral individual wifi be optimal.
The current UI taxes are paid by employers but the incidence of the tax would pre-
sumably be the same if the tax were paid by employees. Similarly, gross wages would
adjust down if UISA deposits were made by employers rather than employees, since
these deposits are the property of the individual workers and are similar to a form of tax-
preferred cash compensation.58 Feldstein and Altman
The maximum weekly benefits are assumed here to be based on income up to $20,000
or a maximum benefit of $200 per week.
On the nature and limits of experience rating, see above, page 5.
This idea was previously suggested in Feldstein (1975).
The experience rating could be strengthened under any of the options by using
employers' experience with unemployment as the basis for the tax used to finance the
cost of benefits paid to individuals with negative UTSA balances.
See Katz (1986) for an earlier use of the PSTD data to study unemployment insur-
ance.
This ratio is calculated as follows. The denominator is the total IJISA payments to all
participants over the period from 1972 to 1991. To calculate the numerator, we focus on
those individuals who had negative terminal balances (at death, retirement, departure
from the sample, or upon reaching 1991). We then identify the last year in which the bal-
ance of each of these "negative terminal balance" individuals was positive and ignore
government payments in all prior years. We then calculate the sum of (1) the negative
balance in that year (the difference between benefits in that year and the sum of the prior
positive balance and the savings deposited that year in the account) and (2) any UTSA
benefits taken in subsequent years by the individual. We subtract from this cumulative
total (3) the amounts that the individual paid to the account (actually directly to the gov-
ernment as repayment for past credit) in all subsequent years. The combination of these
three terms is the net amount that the government pays to negative accounts in excess of
the amounts repaid.
The annual values of BEN, and N, are presented in the statistical appendix of each
year's Economic Report of the President.
References
Baily, M. (1977). "Unemployment Insurance as Insurance for Workers," Industrial and
Labor Relations Review, 30(4):495-504.
Baily, M. (1978). "Some Aspects of Optimal Unemployment Insurance," Journal of Public
Economics, 10(3):379-402.
Blanchard, 0., and J. Tirole (2006). "The Joint Design of Unemployment Insurance and
Employment Protection," Paper presented at the NBER Summer Institute, July 24.
Brown, Alessio J.G., J. Michael Orszag, and Dennis J. Snower (2006). "Unemployment
Accounts and Employment Incentives," Kiel working paper no. 1274.
Card, David, Raj Chetty, and Andrea Weber (2006). "Cash-on-Hand and Competing
Models of Intertemporal Behavior: New Evidence from the Labor Market." NBER work-
ing paper no. 12639 (Cambridge, MA).
Card, D., and PB. Levine (1994). "Unemployment Insurance Taxes and the Cyclical and
Seasonal Properties of Unemployment," Journal of Public Economics, 53(1):1-29.
Chetty, R. (2005). "Why do Unemployment Benefits Lengthen Unemployment Dura-
tions?" NBER working paper no. 11760.Unemployment Insurance Savings Accounts 59
Coloma, C.F.(1996). "Seguro do Desempleo: Teoria, Evidencia y Una Propuesta
(Unemployment Insurance: Theory, Evidence and a Proposal)," Cuadernos de Economia,
33(99):256-320.
Feldstein, M. (1975). "Unemployment Insurance: Time for Reform," Harvard Business
Review, (MarchApril).
Feldstein, M. (1976). "Temporary Layoffs in the Theory of Unemployment," Journal of
Political Economy, 84(5):937-957.
Feldstein, M. (1978). "The Effect of Unemployment Insurance on Temporary Layoff
Unemployment," American Economic Review, 68(5):834-846.
Feldstein, M., and J. Poterba (1984). "Unemployment Insurance and Reservation Wages,"
Journal of Public Economics, 23(1-2):141-167.
Feldstein, M., and E. Ranguelova (1998). "Individual Risk and Intergenerational Risk
Sharing in an Investment-Based Social Security System," NBER working paper no. 6839,
December.
Katz, L. (1986). "Layoffs, Recall and the Duration of Unemployment," NBER working
paper no. 1825, 1986.
Katz, L., and B.D. Meyer (1990). "The Impact of the Potential Duration of Unemployment
Benefits on the Duration of Unemployment," Journal of Public Economics, 41(1):45-72.
Meyer, B. (1995). "Lessons from the U.S. Unemployment Insurance Experiments," Journal
of Economic Literature, 33(1):91-131.
Meyer, B.D., and PT. Rosenbaum (1996). "Repeat Use of Unemployment Insurance,"
NBER working paper no. 5423, January.
Moffit, R. (1985). "Unemployment Insurance and the Distribution of Unemployment
Spells," Journal of Econometrics, 28(1):85-101.
Mortenson, D. (1994). "Reducing Supply-Side Disincentives to Job Creation," in Reducing
Unemployment: Current Issues and Policy Options. Kansas City: Federal Reserve Bank.
Orszag, J.M., and D. Snower (1997). "From Unemployment Benefits to Unemployment
Accounts," mimeo, Birkbeck College, London.
Shimer, R., and I. Werning (2006). "On the Optimal Timing of Benefits with Heterogeneous
Workers and Human Capital Depreciation," NBER working paper no. 12230, May.
Stiglitz, J., and Jungyoll Yun (2005). "Integration of Unemployment Insurance with Retire-
ment Insurance," Journal of Public Economics, 89(11-12):2037-2067.T
a
b
l
e
 
2
.
A
1
A
n
a
l
y
s
i
s
 
o
f
 
A
l
t
e
r
n
a
t
i
v
e
 
O
p
t
i
o
n
s
 
w
i
t
h
 
P
S
I
D
 
D
a
t
a
:
 
F
i
n
i
s
h
e
r
s
 
O
n
l
y
T
h
e
 
a
n
a
l
y
s
i
s
 
i
s
 
b
a
s
e
d
 
o
n
 
t
h
e
 
f
u
l
l
 
s
a
m
p
l
e
 
o
f
 
1
,
9
9
0
 
o
r
i
g
i
n
a
l
 
h
e
a
d
s
 
o
f
 
h
o
u
s
e
h
o
l
d
s
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
P
S
I
D
 
s
a
m
p
l
e
 
f
r
o
m
 
1
9
6
7
 
t
o
 
1
9
9
1
 
w
h
o
 
w
e
r
e
 
r
e
t
i
r
e
d
,
d
e
a
d
 
o
r
 
m
i
s
s
i
n
g
b
y
 
t
h
e
 
e
n
d
 
o
f
 
1
9
9
1
.
 
T
h
e
 
c
a
l
c
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
s
 
u
s
e
 
t
h
e
 
c
o
m
m
e
r
c
i
a
l
 
p
a
p
e
r
 
r
a
t
e
 
o
f
 
r
e
t
u
r
n
 
o
n
 
U
I
S
A
 
b
a
l
a
n
c
e
s
,
 
b
o
t
h
 
p
o
s
i
t
i
v
e
 
a
n
d
 
n
e
g
a
t
i
v
e
.
 
S
e
e
 
t
e
x
t
 
f
o
r
 
d
e
f
i
n
i
t
i
o
n
s
.
O
p
t
i
o
n
 
1
:
 
H
i
g
h
 
w
a
g
e
 
b
a
s
e
O
p
t
i
o
n
 
2
:
 
L
o
w
 
w
a
g
e
 
b
a
s
e
O
p
t
i
o
n
 
3
:
 
T
a
r
g
e
t
 
a
c
c
o
u
n
t
 
f
u
n
d
O
p
t
i
o
n
 
4
:
 
E
x
p
e
r
i
e
n
c
e
-
b
a
s
e
d
 
t
a
r
g
e
t
 
a
c
c
o
u
n
t
 
f
u
n
d
O
p
t
i
o
n
 
5
:
 
E
m
p
l
o
y
e
r
 
p
a
y
s
 
f
i
r
s
t
 
f
i
v
e
 
w
e
e
k
s
 
o
f
 
b
e
n
e
f
i
t
s
P
e
r
c
e
n
t
a
g
e
s
O
p
t
i
o
n
 
1
O
p
t
i
o
n
 
2
O
p
t
i
o
n
 
3
O
p
t
i
o
n
 
4
O
p
t
i
o
n
 
5
A
l
l
 
e
m
p
l
o
y
e
e
s
(
1
)
 
N
e
g
a
t
i
v
e
 
t
e
r
m
i
n
a
l
 
b
a
l
a
n
c
e
5
.
3
6
.
6
6
.
6
6
.
9
5
.
5
(
2
)
 
N
e
g
a
t
i
v
e
 
b
a
l
a
n
c
e
 
e
v
e
r
6
.
4
8
.
2
8
.
2
8
.
5
6
.
5
E
l
i
g
i
b
l
e
 
u
n
e
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
 
s
p
e
l
l
s
(
3
)
 
N
e
g
a
t
i
v
e
 
b
a
l
a
n
c
e
 
a
t
 
e
n
d
 
o
f
 
s
p
e
l
l
2
3
.
9
3
0
.
9
3
1
.
5
3
3
.
4
2
7
.
6
(
4
)
 
N
e
g
a
t
i
v
e
 
b
a
l
a
n
c
e
 
&
 
n
e
g
a
t
i
v
e
 
t
e
r
m
i
n
a
l
 
b
a
l
a
n
c
e
2
0
.
0
2
5
.
8
2
6
.
1
2
7
.
7
2
1
.
4
E
m
p
l
o
y
e
e
s
 
w
i
t
h
 
n
e
g
a
t
i
v
e
 
b
a
l
a
n
c
e
s
 
e
v
e
r
(
5
)
 
R
e
t
u
r
n
 
t
o
 
p
o
s
i
t
i
v
e
 
t
e
r
m
i
n
a
l
 
b
a
l
a
n
c
e
1
7
.
6
1
9
.
5
1
9
.
4
1
9
.
0
1
5
.
0
U
n
e
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
 
c
o
m
p
e
n
s
a
t
i
o
n
 
d
o
l
l
a
r
s
(
6
)
 
N
e
g
a
t
i
v
e
 
b
a
l
a
n
c
e
 
&
 
n
e
g
a
t
i
v
e
 
t
e
r
m
i
n
a
l
 
b
a
l
a
n
c
e
3
1
.
9
3
9
.
2
4
0
.
0
4
2
.
7
3
4
.
6
(
7
)
 
N
e
g
a
t
i
v
e
 
t
e
r
m
i
n
a
l
b
a
l
a
n
c
e
4
7
.
6
5
8
.
6
5
8
.
6
6
1
.
4
5
0
.
6
N
e
t
 
g
o
v
e
r
n
m
e
n
t
 
p
a
y
m
e
n
t
s
(
8
)
 
P
e
r
c
e
n
t
 
o
f
 
t
o
t
a
l
 
U
I
S
A
 
p
a
y
m
e
n
t
s
3
1
.
5
4
0
.
7
4
1
.
2
4
3
.
8
3
1
.
4T
a
b
l
e
 
2
.
A
2
A
n
a
l
y
s
i
s
 
o
f
 
A
l
t
e
r
n
a
t
i
v
e
 
O
p
t
i
o
n
s
 
w
i
t
h
 
P
S
I
D
 
D
a
t
a
:
 
5
.
5
%
 
R
e
t
u
r
n
T
h
e
 
a
n
a
l
y
s
i
s
 
i
s
 
b
a
s
e
d
 
o
n
 
t
h
e
 
f
u
l
l
 
s
a
m
p
l
e
 
o
f
 
2
,
7
7
3
 
o
r
i
g
i
n
a
l
 
h
e
a
d
s
 
o
f
 
h
o
u
s
e
h
o
l
d
s
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
P
S
I
D
 
s
a
m
p
l
e
 
f
r
o
m
 
1
9
6
7
 
t
o
 
1
9
9
1
.
 
T
h
e
 
c
a
l
c
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
s
 
u
s
e
a
 
5
.
5
 
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
r
e
a
l
 
r
a
t
e
 
o
f
 
r
e
t
u
r
n
 
o
n
 
U
I
S
A
 
b
a
l
a
n
c
e
s
,
 
b
o
t
h
 
p
o
s
i
t
i
v
e
 
a
n
d
 
n
e
g
a
t
i
v
e
.
 
S
e
e
 
t
e
x
t
 
f
o
r
 
d
e
f
i
n
i
t
i
o
n
s
.
O
p
t
i
o
n
 
1
:
 
H
i
g
h
 
w
a
g
e
 
b
a
s
e
O
p
t
i
o
n
 
2
:
 
L
o
w
 
w
a
g
e
 
b
a
s
e
O
p
t
i
o
n
 
3
:
 
T
a
r
g
e
t
 
a
c
c
o
u
n
t
 
f
u
n
d
O
p
t
i
o
n
 
4
:
 
E
x
p
e
r
i
e
n
c
e
-
b
a
s
e
d
 
t
a
r
g
e
t
 
a
c
c
o
u
n
t
 
f
u
n
d
O
p
t
i
o
n
 
5
:
 
E
x
p
e
r
i
e
n
c
e
 
r
a
t
i
n
g
:
 
E
m
p
l
o
y
e
r
 
p
a
y
s
 
f
i
v
e
 
w
e
e
k
s
P
e
r
c
e
n
t
a
g
e
s
O
p
t
i
o
n
 
1
O
p
t
i
o
n
 
2
O
p
t
i
o
n
 
3
O
p
t
i
o
n
 
4
O
p
t
i
o
n
 
5
A
l
l
 
e
m
p
l
o
y
e
e
s
(
1
)
 
N
e
g
a
t
i
v
e
 
t
e
r
m
i
n
a
l
 
b
a
l
a
n
c
e
4
.
9
5
.
8
6
.
0
6
.
4
4
.
8
(
2
)
 
N
e
g
a
t
i
v
e
 
b
a
l
a
n
c
e
 
e
v
e
r
5
.
7
7
.
4
7
.
8
8
.
2
6
.
0
E
l
i
g
i
b
l
e
u
n
e
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
 
s
p
e
l
l
s
(
3
)
 
N
e
g
a
t
i
v
e
 
b
a
l
a
n
c
e
 
a
t
 
e
n
d
 
o
f
 
s
p
e
l
l
2
0
.
6
2
6
.
1
2
7
.
1
2
8
.
2
2
3
.
8
(
4
)
 
N
e
g
a
t
i
v
e
 
b
a
l
a
n
c
e
 
&
 
n
e
g
a
t
i
v
e
 
t
e
r
m
i
n
a
l
 
b
a
l
a
n
c
e
1
8
.
2
2
2
.
4
2
3
.
0
2
4
.
1
1
8
.
4
E
m
p
l
o
y
e
e
s
 
w
i
t
h
 
n
e
g
a
t
i
v
e
 
b
a
l
a
n
c
e
s
 
e
v
e
r
(
5
)
 
R
e
t
u
r
n
 
t
o
 
p
o
s
i
t
i
v
e
 
t
e
r
m
i
n
a
l
 
b
a
l
a
n
c
e
1
3
.
6
2
1
.
2
2
2
.
7
2
2
.
4
1
9
.
7
U
n
e
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
 
c
o
m
p
e
n
s
a
t
i
o
n
 
d
o
l
l
a
r
s
(
6
)
 
N
e
g
a
t
i
v
e
 
b
a
l
a
n
c
e
 
&
 
n
e
g
a
t
i
v
e
 
t
e
r
m
i
n
a
l
 
b
a
l
a
n
c
e
2
7
.
6
3
4
.
0
3
5
.
2
3
7
.
6
2
9
.
5
(
7
)
 
N
e
g
a
t
i
v
e
 
t
e
r
m
i
n
a
l
 
b
a
l
a
n
c
e
4
2
.
4
4
9
.
6
5
1
.
4
5
4
.
5
4
2
.
9
N
e
t
 
g
o
v
e
r
n
m
e
n
t
 
p
a
y
m
e
n
t
s
(
8
)
 
P
e
r
c
e
n
t
 
o
f
 
t
o
t
a
l
 
U
T
S
A
 
p
a
y
m
e
n
t
s
2
4
.
6
3
1
.
5
3
3
.
7
3
5
.
4
2
4
.
9T
a
b
l
e
 
2
.
A
3
A
n
a
l
y
s
i
s
 
o
f
 
A
l
t
e
r
n
a
t
i
v
e
 
O
p
t
i
o
n
s
 
w
i
t
h
 
P
S
I
D
 
D
a
t
a
:
 
F
i
n
i
s
h
e
r
s
 
O
n
l
y
:
 
5
.
5
%
 
R
e
t
u
r
n
C
'
T
h
e
 
a
n
a
l
y
s
i
s
 
i
s
 
b
a
s
e
d
 
o
n
 
t
h
e
 
f
u
l
l
 
s
a
m
p
l
e
 
o
f
 
1
,
9
9
0
 
o
r
i
g
i
n
a
l
 
h
e
a
d
s
 
o
f
 
h
o
u
s
e
h
o
l
d
s
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
P
S
I
D
 
s
a
m
p
l
e
 
f
r
o
m
 
1
9
6
7
 
t
o
 
1
9
9
1
 
w
h
o
 
w
e
r
e
 
r
e
t
i
r
e
d
,
d
e
a
d
 
o
r
 
m
i
s
s
i
n
g
b
y
 
t
h
e
 
e
n
d
 
o
f
 
1
9
9
1
.
 
T
h
e
 
c
a
l
c
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
s
 
u
s
e
 
a
 
5
.
5
 
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
 
r
e
a
l
 
r
a
t
e
 
o
f
 
r
e
t
u
r
n
 
o
n
 
U
T
S
A
 
b
a
l
a
n
c
e
s
,
 
b
o
t
h
 
p
o
s
i
t
i
v
e
 
a
n
d
 
n
e
g
a
t
i
v
e
.
 
S
e
e
 
t
e
x
t
 
f
o
r
d
e
f
i
n
i
t
i
o
n
s
.
O
p
t
i
o
n
 
1
:
 
H
i
g
h
 
w
a
g
e
 
b
a
s
e
O
p
t
i
o
n
 
2
:
 
L
o
w
 
w
a
g
e
 
b
a
s
e
O
p
t
i
o
n
 
3
:
 
T
a
r
g
e
t
 
a
c
c
o
u
n
t
 
f
u
n
d
O
p
t
i
o
n
 
4
:
 
E
x
p
e
r
i
e
n
c
e
-
b
a
s
e
d
 
t
a
r
g
e
t
 
a
c
c
o
u
n
t
 
f
u
n
d
O
p
t
i
o
n
 
5
:
 
E
x
p
e
r
i
e
n
c
e
 
r
a
t
i
n
g
:
 
E
m
p
l
o
y
e
r
 
p
a
y
s
 
f
i
v
e
 
w
e
e
k
s
P
e
r
c
e
n
t
a
g
e
s
O
p
t
i
o
n
 
1
O
p
t
i
o
n
 
2
O
p
t
i
o
n
 
3
O
p
t
i
o
n
 
4
O
p
t
i
o
n
S
A
l
l
 
e
m
p
l
o
y
e
e
s
(
1
)
 
N
e
g
a
t
i
v
e
 
t
e
r
m
i
n
a
l
 
b
a
l
a
n
c
e
4
.
9
5
.
7
5
.
8
6
.
2
4
.
6
(
2
)
 
N
e
g
a
t
i
v
e
b
a
l
a
n
c
e
e
v
e
r
5
.
3
6
.
9
7
.
1
7
.
4
5
.
4
E
l
i
g
i
b
l
e
 
u
n
e
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
 
s
p
e
l
l
s
(
3
)
 
N
e
g
a
t
i
v
e
 
b
a
l
a
n
c
e
 
a
t
 
e
n
d
 
o
f
 
s
p
e
l
l
1
9
.
9
2
6
.
8
2
7
.
5
2
8
.
5
2
3
.
7
(
4
)
 
N
e
g
a
t
i
v
e
 
b
a
l
a
n
c
e
 
&
 
n
e
g
a
t
i
v
e
 
t
e
r
m
i
n
a
l
 
b
a
l
a
n
c
e
1
8
.
0
2
3
.
2
2
3
.
8
2
5
.
0
1
8
.
0
E
m
p
l
o
y
e
e
s
 
w
i
t
h
 
n
e
g
a
t
i
v
e
 
b
a
l
a
n
c
e
s
 
e
v
e
r
(
5
)
 
R
e
t
u
r
n
 
t
o
 
p
o
s
i
t
i
v
e
 
t
e
r
m
i
n
a
l
 
b
a
l
a
n
c
e
8
.
5
1
6
.
5
1
7
.
3
1
6
.
0
1
4
.
7
U
n
e
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
 
c
o
m
p
e
n
s
a
t
i
o
n
 
d
o
l
l
a
r
s
(
6
)
 
N
e
g
a
t
i
v
e
 
b
a
l
a
n
c
e
 
&
 
n
e
g
a
t
i
v
e
 
t
e
r
m
i
n
a
l
 
b
a
l
a
n
c
e
2
7
.
8
3
3
.
9
3
5
.
1
3
7
.
7
2
9
.
4
(
7
)
 
N
e
g
a
t
i
v
e
t
e
r
m
i
n
a
l
b
a
l
a
n
c
e
4
5
.
0
5
3
.
2
5
4
.
3
5
8
.
1
4
4
.
1
N
e
t
 
g
o
v
e
r
n
m
e
n
t
 
p
a
y
m
e
n
t
s
(
8
)
 
P
e
r
c
e
n
t
 
o
f
 
t
o
t
a
l
 
U
I
S
A
 
p
a
y
m
e
n
t
s
2
8
.
9
3
5
.
6
3
6
.
9
3
9
.
5
2
8
.
0T
a
b
l
e
 
2
.
A
4
D
i
s
t
r
i
b
u
t
i
o
n
a
l
 
E
f
f
e
c
t
s
 
o
f
 
S
h
i
f
t
i
n
g
 
f
r
o
m
 
C
u
r
r
e
n
t
 
U
I
 
R
u
l
e
s
 
t
o
 
a
 
U
I
S
A
 
S
y
s
t
e
m
 
W
i
t
h
 
5
.
5
 
%
 
R
a
t
e
 
o
f
 
R
e
t
u
r
n
O
p
t
i
o
n
 
1
:
 
H
i
g
h
 
w
a
g
e
 
b
a
s
e
;
 
O
p
t
i
o
n
 
2
:
 
L
o
w
 
w
a
g
e
 
b
a
s
e
;
 
O
p
t
i
o
n
 
3
:
 
T
a
r
g
e
t
 
a
c
c
o
u
n
t
 
f
u
n
d
.
S
e
e
 
t
e
x
t
 
f
o
r
 
o
t
h
e
r
 
d
e
f
i
n
i
t
i
o
n
s
.
P
r
e
s
e
n
t
 
d
i
s
c
o
u
n
t
e
d
 
v
a
l
u
e
s
 
a
r
e
 
c
a
l
c
u
l
a
t
e
d
 
u
s
i
n
g
 
t
h
e
 
c
o
m
m
e
r
c
i
a
l
 
p
a
p
e
r
 
r
a
t
e
.
I
n
c
o
m
e
 
Q
u
i
n
t
i
l
e
1
s
t
2
n
d
3
r
d
4
t
h
5
t
h
L
i
f
e
t
i
m
e
 
m
e
a
n
 
a
n
n
u
a
l
 
i
n
c
o
m
e
 
(
1
9
9
1
$
)
1
2
2
9
3
2
3
9
7
6
3
1
9
4
8
4
0
9
7
7
7
1
5
6
1
P
D
V
 
o
f
 
U
I
S
A
 
p
o
s
i
t
i
v
e
 
t
e
r
m
i
n
a
l
 
b
a
l
a
n
c
e
s
 
m
i
n
u
s
U
I
S
A
 
s
a
v
i
n
g
 
d
e
p
o
s
i
t
s
O
p
t
i
o
n
 
1
-
4
1
0
-
4
2
8
-
5
2
1
-
3
4
1
-
2
0
2
O
p
t
i
o
n
 
2
-
3
9
7
-
4
1
0
-
4
5
4
-
3
2
5
-
1
6
1
O
p
t
i
o
n
 
3
-
3
9
0
-
4
0
7
-
4
5
3
-
3
1
9
-
1
5
9
P
D
V
 
o
f
 
p
a
y
r
o
l
l
 
t
a
x
 
r
e
d
u
c
t
i
o
n
s
O
p
t
i
o
n
 
1
3
3
1
4
4
8
4
6
3
4
8
2
5
0
9
O
p
t
i
o
n
 
2
3
1
4
4
0
8
4
2
0
4
3
7
4
6
4
O
p
t
i
o
n
 
3
2
9
2
3
9
4
4
0
7
4
2
3
4
4
8
P
D
V
 
o
f
 
U
I
S
A
 
p
o
s
i
t
i
v
e
 
t
e
r
m
i
n
a
l
 
b
a
l
a
n
c
e
s
 
p
l
u
s
p
a
y
r
o
l
l
 
t
a
x
 
r
e
d
u
c
t
i
o
n
s
 
m
i
n
u
s
 
s
a
v
i
n
g
 
d
e
p
o
s
i
t
s
O
p
t
i
o
n
 
1
-
7
9
2
0
-
5
8
1
4
1
3
0
7
O
p
t
i
o
n
 
2
-
9
6
-
2
-
3
4
1
1
2
3
0
3
O
p
t
i
o
n
 
3
-
9
8
-
1
3
-
4
6
1
0
4
2
8
9